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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT-TRUE
DOUBT RULE-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the "true doubt rule" was invalid because it al-
lowed claimants to prevail without meeting the required burden of
persuasion.
Greenwich Collieries v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, 990 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1993).
In 1989, Andrew Ondecko ("Ondecko" or "Claimant") filed a
claim with the United States Department of Labor for disability
benefits available under the Black Lung Benefits Act' ("Act") and
regulations established under its authority.2 Ondecko had worked
nearly thirty-one years in coal mines.' The last five to six years of
this work experience were with Greenwich Collieries, where Claim-
ant fixed and replaced pipe in underground mines.4 Medical evi-
dence of Ondecko's condition consisted of X-rays, numerous X-ray
1. Greenwich Collieries v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
("OWCP"), 990 F.2d 730, 731 (3d. Cir. 1993). Black lung, a form of pneumoconiosis, is a
lung disease that results from long-term inhalation of coal dust. WESTR's DICTIONARY 101,
774 (Encyclopedic ed. 1987). The purpose of the Black Lung Benefits Act is to benefit the
many coal mine workers suffering from this disease. Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 901-945 (1988).
2. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 731. A claimant will prevail under the Black Lung Bene-
fits Act if the claimant proves that 1) pneumoconiosis caused the disability, 2) the disease
was caused, at least in part, by coal mine employment, and 3) total disability resulted. Mul-
lins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 141 (1987), reh'g denied, 484 U.S. 1047
(1988). Regulations established pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act provide, in part "a
finding of the existence of pneumoconiosis may be made as follows: (1) A chest X-ray con-
ducted and classified in accordance with § 718.102 may form the basis for a finding of the
existence of pneumoconiosis .. " 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a) (1993). The regulations require the
miner's pneumonoconiosis be caused by the miner's employment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)
(1993). The regulations establish a presumption of causation, providing "if a miner who is
suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for ten years or more in one or
more coal mines, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the pneumoconiosis arose out
of such employment .. " 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(b) (1993). A miner must be totally disabled
to collect benefits under the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(a) (1993). Total disability can be es-
tablished by pulmonary function tests, arterial blood gas tests, cor pulmonale with right side
congestive heart failure, or where "a physician exercising reasoned medical judgement,
based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, concludes that
a miner's respiratory or pulmonary condition prevents or prevented the miner from engag-
ing in [coal mining or comparable work]. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204 (1993).
3. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 731.
4. Id.
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interpretations, and medical reports.'
In a preliminary determination, the Claimant was denied bene-
fits by the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams ("OWCP"), based on a finding that Ondecko had no disease
or disability.' The preliminary determination was reversed after a
hearing before an administrative law judge." The administrative
law judge awarded the claim despite a showing by the employer
that raised a doubt as to the likelihood that Ondecko had the dis-
ease pneumoconiosis (the first element of a claim) and that
Ondecko was totally disabled (the third element of a claim).8 This
result was predicated on the application of the judicially created
"true doubt" rules that is used to rule in favor of a claimant when
the ultimate facts are equally probative. 10 Greenwich Collieries ap-
pealed to the United States Department of Labor Benefits Review
Board ("Board") where the decision of the administrative law
judge was affirmed. 1 This decision was appealed by Greenwich
Collieries to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit."2
5. Ondecko v. Greenwich Collieries, No. 89-BLA-2019, OWCP No. 198-20-7288, 1990
BLA LEXIS 1105, at *12-*19 (Dep't Labor Aug. 3, 1990).
6. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 731.
7. Id. at 732.
8. Ondecko, 1990 BLA LEXIS 1105, at *19-*22. Evidence of the first element, the
existence of pneumoconiosis, was provided by X-rays and a total of 44 X-ray interpretations
(most of which were made by Board-certified radiologists or 'B'-readers). Id. at *15-*17. A
'B' reader is a radiologist that has passed an exam conducted by the Department of Health
& Human Services demonstrating proficiency in interpreting X-rays for the purpose of es-
tablishing whether or not one has pneumoconiosis. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 145 n.16. The ad-
ministrative law judge found that there were sufficient readings by 'B'-readers or Board-
certified radiologists supporting a finding of pneumoconiosis to raise a doubt concerning the
negative readings. Ondecko, 1990 BLA Lexis 1105, at *16. Evidence of the third element,
total disability, consisted of the reports and opinions of eight physicians. Id. at *18-*19.
Half of the physicians suggested that the claimant was disabled by pneumoconiosis and of
these only two suggested that the claimant was totally disabled. Id. at *19 n.11. The others
considered the claimant's level of functioning unimpaired or only partially impaired but due
primarily to cigarette smoking. Id. at *19 n.12. The second element, causation, was estab-
lished via the presumption set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(b) by the demonstration that
Ondecko had worked for more than 10 years in coal mines. Ondecko, 1990 BLA LEXIS
1105, at *17. See note 2 for the text of the presumption.
9. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 732. The sentiment for such a rule is premised on the
belief that the employer is the party best able to bear the risk of nonpersuasion. Id. Appli-
cation of the true doubt rule is also grounded on the belief that the Act should insure
against faultless injury to workers, and therefore, such burdens should be placed on the
employer. Id.
10. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 732.
11. Id. at 731.
12. Id. Section 21(c) of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act incorpo-
rated by the Black Lung Benefits Act grants the Third Circuit jurisdiction over the appeal
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The issue before the Third Circuit was whether the administra-
tive law judge and the Board erred when they allowed a claimant
to receive disability benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act
pursuant to the judicially created "true doubt" rule when the
probability that the claimant was disabled with black lung disease
was found to be equivalent to the probability that he was not.13
Greenwich Collieries argued that the application of the true doubt
rule to black lung cases was improper because it violated the ex-
press language of the Black Lung Regulations 14 which require that
the claimant bear the burden of persuasion. 15 Ondecko, relying on
United States Supreme Court precedent, 6 contended that the lan-
guage of the regulations (requiring that the proponent have the
burden of proving facts) meant the proponent must establish a
prima facie case merely by coming forward with some evidence
supporting his claim, and therefore, the burden of persuasion re-
mains with the employer.1 7 The court agreed with the employer's
argument and found the use of the true doubt rule contrary to re-
cent U.S. Supreme Court precedent.' 8
The Third Circuit invoked the United States Supreme Court de-
cision of Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP 9 which, in agreeing
with the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the Labor Depart-
ment's regulations, required that the statutory presumption of
pneumoconiosis by X-rays be shown by a preponderance of the ev-
idence.20 Applying this precedent to the case at hand, the court
from a final order of the Board. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 731 n.1 (citing the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §921(c) (1986); the Black Lung Benefits Act,
30 U.S.C. §923(a) (1988)).
13. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 731.
14. 20 C.F.R. § 718.1-.404 (1993).
15. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 734. The applicable regulation states, "the burden of
proving a fact alleged in connection with any provision of this part shall rest with the party
making such allegation." 20 C.F.R. § 718.403 (1993).
16. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). In this
case, the Supreme Court interpreted the language of the Administrative Procedure Act (5
U.S.C. § 556(d) (1993)) which states that "[e]xcept as otherwise proscribed by statute, the
proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof" to mean that the claimant had the
burden of production. Id. See notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
17. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 734.
18. Id. at 733.
19. 484 U.S. 135 (1987). See notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
20. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 137-38. In reaching its decision, the majority analyzed the
interim regulations and reasoned that because they required that an X-ray "establish" the
presence of pneumoconiosis (under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)) a single piece of evidence would
not suffice. Id. at 146-52. Since interpretations along with the X-rays are necessary "to es-
tablish" the presence of black lung it would not be logical to limit the admission of evidence
at this phase to claimant's evidence and employer's evidence as rebuttal. Id. Consequently,
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reasoned that Ondecko could not qualify for disability benefits un-
less his X-rays showed by a preponderance of the evidence that he
had black lung disease.21 This burden, however, was not carried, as
the administrative law judge found that the Claimant had only
raised true doubt as to whether the employer, had met his burden
on the issues of disease or disability.22 The court concluded that
such a finding was improper and conflicted with Mullins.2 3
The court stated that applying the rationale of Mullins alone
was sufficient to dispose of the case, but went on to show why the
true doubt rule was generally inappropriate under both the Black
Lung Benefits Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.2"
Though conceding the inherent ambiguity of the phrase "burden of
proof" as it has been taken to alternately stand for both burden of
production and burden of persuasion,25  the court rejected
Ondecko's reliance on NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp.26 The court found it significant that section 718.403 of the
Black Lung Regulations required that the claimant have the "bur-
den of proving a fact" as opposed to the "burden of proof. 2 7 The
Third Circuit concluded that since the common English definition
of "prove" was similar in meaning to the term of art "burden of
persuasion," the language of the regulation meant the latter.28 The
court reasoned that because the Black Lung Benefits Act ad-
dressed the issue, the Administrative Procedure Act was super-
seded (making reliance on Transportation Management irrelevant
as the holding in that case was based on an analysis of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act).2" Thus, the court concluded, that when
it follows that the claimant must carry the burden of persuasion before invoking the interim
presumption of pneumoconiosis. Id.
21. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 733.
22. Id. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 734. Note that in Mullins, as in the case sub judice, the proper application
of the burden of persuasion was at issue with respect to demonstrating the existence of
pneumoconiosis by X-ray. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 734. See the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30
U.S.C. §§901-45 (1988); the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551-59; 701-06 (1988).
25. The "burden of persuasion" is defined as the onus on the party that must con-
vince the trier of fact of all elements of his case. The "burden of producing evidence" is
defined as the burden of producing some evidence on all elements to avoid a directed ver-
dict. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 135 (6th ed. 1990).
26. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 734 (distinguishing NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983)). See note 16.
27. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 735. See 20 C.F.R. §718.403 (1993).
28. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 734. The court defined the "burden of persuasion" as "the
necessity of establishing a fact" and "to prove" as "to establish or make certain." Id.
29. Id. at 734-36. The Administrative Procedure Act allows its authority to be super-
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applying for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, the
claimant must bear the burden of persuasion as to each ultimate
fact in order to prevail3 0 The standard the claimants must have
attained in determining whether or not they have met their bur-
den, the court stated, was a preponderance of evidence" as man-
dated by the Administrative Procedure Act (as interpreted by the
Supreme Court)" and incorporated by the enabling act.33 The true
doubt rule, which allows the burden of persuasion to be met even
when evidence was not more convincing than evidence offered in
opposition, the court concluded, was contrary to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.34 Based on such an interpretation, the court
believed that to apply the true doubt rule would literally rewrite
both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Black Lung Bene-
fits Act.3 5 Because it was unclear if the administrative law judge
had evaluated whether or not the evidence was a preponderance,
the court vacated the administrative law judge's order and re-
seded if expressly provided in a statute. Id. at 736 n.5. Consequently, because the Black
Lung Benefits Act, as interpreted by the Third Circuit in the case sub judice, placed the
burden upon the claimant, the court decided that it was unnecessary to address the issue as
to whether section 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, similarly assigned the bur-
den of proof. Id. at 735 n.4. Transportation Management is applicable in cases where the
Administrative Procedure Act is not superseded by the enabling act. Id. at 734. But note
that in a similar case, decided one month later, Mahler Terminals, Inc v. Director, OWCP,
992 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3254 (Sept. 23, 1993) (No.
93-474), the court addressed the Transportation Management argument not discussed in
Greenwich. Mahler, 992 F.2d at 1281. See notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
30. Greenwich, 990 F. 2d at 735.
31. Id. at 736. The court defined a preponderance of the evidence as, " '[elvidence
which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposi-
tion to it.'" Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)).
32. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 736. In Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 98, 102 (1981), the
Supreme Court stated that " '[the language of the [Administrative Procedure Act] itself
implies an enactment of a standard of proof, [which] . . . is the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard.'" Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 736 (quoting Steadman, 450 U.S. at 91, 98, 102).
33. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 735. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, which is incorporated by the Black Lung Benefits Act, makes applicable the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (1986); Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 932(a)
(1988).
34. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 736 n.5. Section 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act
states that a "[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify this subchapter
• . . except to the extent that it does so expressly." Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 559 (1988). The court, agreeing with petitioner, held that neither the legislative history,
the longstanding use of the rule, the statute's acceptance by the courts, nor Congressional
silence on the issue could be considered equivalent to an expressed statutory provision justi-
fying the supersedence of the Administrative Procedure Act on the issue of the required
standard of proof. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 736 n.5.
35. Id.
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manded the case for further proceedings to so decide.3"
The first case believed to discuss the true doubt rule is Fidelity
& Casualty Co. v. Burris.3 7 In Burris, the plaintiff suffered heat
stroke while working with other laborers repairing curbing and
gutters.3 8 The issue before the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals was whether an employee who suffered heat stroke on the job
had sustained an injury arising out of the employee's work.3
Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 0 compensation was awarded only if the worker suffered injury
arising out of the course of employment. 1 It was contended by the
defendant that the employee's exposure to the sun was no greater
a hazard beyond what the general public was exposed to, and as a
consequence the injury could not be considered to have arisen out
of the plaintiff's employment.42 The court disagreed, however, rea-
soning that the nature of the weather on the day in question and
the duration of exposure was well beyond what the general public
would have experienced. 4 Though the case was resolved based on
a reversal of a secondary finding of fact, the court went on to con-
clude that because the nature of compensation laws was to provide
indemnity for faultless accidents, if doubt exists, it should be re-
solved in the favor of the claimant."' This rule has evolved as a
convenient method by some courts and agencies to allocate the
burden of persuasion to the employer.45
Attacks on the true doubt rule often maintain that the use of the
36. Id. at 737.
37. 59 F.2d 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1932). See Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 992
F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993) (indicating that the true doubt rule first appeared in Burris).
38. Burris, 59 F.2d at 1043.
39. Id.
40. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1986)).
41. Burris, 59 F.2d at 1043.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1044.
44. Id. The court stated that:
Accidents in industry are inevitable, and the enactment of compensation laws grew
out of a general recognition of a duty owing by society to an injured employee to
secure him protection, and this the act seeks to accomplish through the means of
insurance built up by premiums paid by the employers. Where there is doubt, it
should be resolved in favor of the injured employee or his dependent family. In the
circumstances shown in the record here, we think petitioner established a case of
accidental death arising out of the employment and compensable under the statute.
To reach a different conclusion would be to indulge subtlety at the expense of the
plain purpose and intent of the law.
Id.
45. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 732.
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rule is contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act. Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. EPA,4  Steadman v. SEC,47 and N.L.R.B. v.
Transportation Management Corp.48 provide the basis for this
course of reasoning.
In Environmental Defense Fund, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit dealt with the issue of whether the first sentence of section
556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act4 9 (requiring that the
proponent of a rule or order carry the burden of proof) allocated to
the proponent the burden of production or persuasion." The court
reasoned that the term "burden of proof" was split into the burden
of production (the burden of coming forward with evidence) and
the burden of persuasion.5 1 Based on an analysis of precedents in
other circuits and the legislative history of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the term "burden of
proof" as used in section 556(d) referred only to the burden of
production.2
In Steadman, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
issue as to whether the third sentence of section 556(d) of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act 53 required the Securities and Exchange
Commission to prevail by a preponderance of the evidence before
it could enforce sanctions against violators of federal securities
laws. 4 The Securities and Exchange Commission held an on-the-
record hearing and found that the defendant had violated securi-
ties laws.5 5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defend-
ant's contention that an improper standard of the burden of per-
46. 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. EPA,
431 U.S. 925 (1977).
47. 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
48. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
49. The first sentence of section 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act states
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden
of proof." Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988).
50. Environmental Defense Fund, 548 F.2d at 1013. The instant case was an appeal
to the D.C. Circuit from a denial of EPA approval for a chemical pesticide. Id.
51. Id. at 1014.
52. Id. at 1013-17.
53. The third sentence of section 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act states
"[a] sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the
whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by and in accordance
with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988).
54. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 95. The defendant contended that the Securities and Ex-





suasion had been used, and affirmed the decision of the
Commission.56 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion af-
firming the court of appeals decision, stated that the judiciary has
traditionally established the appropriate degree of proof necessary
for a claimant or proponent of an order to meet its burden where
Congress was silent, but where Congress has spoken the courts
must defer." The Court reasoned that Congress had spoken
through the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Act must
therefore resolve the issue in question because the standard of
proof was not defined in the relevant security laws."8 In interpret-
ing the third sentence of section 556(d), the Court concluded that
the language used in the Administrative Procedure Act indicated
that Congress intended to adopt a standard of proof.5 9 Addition-
ally the Court concluded that the legislative history of section
556(d) made clear that the standard expressly adopted was the
preponderance of evidence standard."0 The Court concluded that
the Commission used the appropriate standard and affirmed the
decision below."1
In 1983, six years after Environmental Defense Fund, the
United States Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement,6" endorsed the D.C. Circuit interpretation of the first
sentence of section 556(d).6 In Transportation Management, a
bus driver brought a claim before the National Labor Relations
Board arguing that his employer had discharged him unfairly."'
The National Labor Relations Board, by its own longstanding in-
terpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 5 required that
the employer, not the proponent of the order, carry the burden of
persuasion. 6 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 284 (1966)).
58. Id. at 96. Section 556 of the Administration Procedure Act "applies... to hear-
ings required by sections 553 or 554 of this title. ... Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 556(a) (1990). Section 554 "applies ... in every case of adjudication required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1986).
59. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 98-102.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 104.
62. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
63. Id. at 403.
64. Id. at 396. The employee alleged that his employer laid him off because he had
made efforts to organize members of the work force and convince them to join the Team-
ster's Union. Id.
65. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (1973 & Supp. 1993).
°66. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 395. The National Labor Relations
Vol. 32:361
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and remanded the case to the National Labor Relations Board re-
quiring that the burden of persuasion of the affirmative defense67
be placed on the proponent.6 The Supreme Court found that the
National Labor Relations Act did not mandate that the burden of
persuasion for the affirmative defense be placed on the propo-
nent."9 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the
employer's argument that section 556(d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act allocates the burden of persuasion to the propo-
nent.70 Pointing to Environmental Defense Fund, the Court reiter-
ated its holding by indicating that the first sentence of section
556(d) only determines the allocation of the burden of going for-
ward, not the burden of persuasion.'
As inferred by the United States Supreme Court in Steadman,
the Administrative Procedure Act's requirements concerning the
appropriate standard for the burden of persuasion and its alloca-
tion apply only when the enabling act has not addressed the is-
sue.7 2 The enabling act that is most frequently used in the applica-
tion of the true doubt rule is the Black Lung Benefits Act.
Hundreds of thousands of coal mine workers are at risk of con-
tracting the progressively debilitating pulmonary condition pneu-
moconiosis because of continued exposure to coal dust. In re-
sponse to this impending human crisis, Congress passed the first of
several enactments in 1969 for the purpose of providing support
and relief for the many potential victims of the disease and their
families.74 Claims filed under the Black Lung Benefits Program on
or after July 1, 1973, are now divided into two categories. 5 Claims
filed on or after July 1, 1973, but before April 1, 1980 are processed
Board required the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence be met by the
employer on the issue of whether the employee had been discharged because of antiunion
animus and (on what it considered an affirmative defense) whether the employee was dis-
charged for other permitted reasons. Id.
67. Id. at 397. In essence the First Circuit changed the National Labor Relations
Board rule to one that requires the General Counsel (see note 71) to show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the employee would not have been fired had the employee person-
ally not been involved in union activities. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 402-03.
70. Id.
71. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 403-04 n.7. Note that in this case the
proponent was the general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board acting on behalf
of the complainant who alleged wrongful discharge. Id.
72. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 105.
73. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 138.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 139.
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under "interim regulations. ' 76 Claims filed on or after April 1,
1980, are governed by "permanent regulations."'77 Claims under the
interim regulations require that a claimant establish total disabil-
ity, that the disability was caused totally or in part by black lung
disease, and that the contraction of the disease was related to work
in coal mines.78 Under the interim regulations, these requirements
are presumed, provided that an X-ray establishes the existence of
black lung.79 Once established, the presumption may be rebutted
by the employer by a showing that the claimant did not have black
lung disease.80
The question of what constitutes sufficient evidence to invoke
the presumption was answered by the United States Supreme
Court in Mullins.81 The majority opinion of the Supreme Court,
written by Justice Stevens, held that because the regulations em-
ployed the word "establish" throughout the regulation concerning
the interim presumption,82 a single positive reading of an X-ray
was insufficient to invoke the presumption." The majority's opin-
ion concluded that the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the
interim regulations (requiring at least one qualifying fact be
proven by the preponderance of the evidence) was consistent with
the regulation's text. 4 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
in a vigorous dissent, argued that the plain meaning of the regula-
tion required that the claimant establish the presence of the dis-
ease by merely coming forward with evidence. 5 Additional X-rays
and data provided by the employer would not be ignored but could
be reviewed and compared during rebuttal phase.8"
Though not addressed directly, dictas7 by the majority opinion
76. Id. The interim regulations are set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, 20
C.F.R. § 727 (1993).
77. Id. The permanent regulations are set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations,
20 C.F.R. § 718 (1993).
78. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 141.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 143-44.
81. Id. at 138. The court below held "that a single item of qualifying evidence is
always sufficient" to invoke the presumption. The Secretary of Labor interpreted his own
regulations to require the claimant to establish at least one of the qualifying facts by a
preponderance of the evidence before the interim presumption is invoked. Id. (note that the
case was an appeal of Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986)).
82. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) (1993).
83. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 146-51.
84. Id. at 152.
85. Id. at 163-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 152. The language supportive of the true doubt rule (see note 88) though
Vol. 32:361
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in Mullins may have left the true doubt rule intact as applied to
cases under the interim presumption.8 In the recent decision, of
Freeman United Coal Mining v. OWCP,89 the Seventh Circuit
evaluated the continued application of the true doubt rule under
the interim regulations in light of Mullins and under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. 0 In Freeman, the claimant worked in coal
mines for forty-five years."' His initial claim for benefits was made
in October of 1978.92 Evidence of disease consisted of three read-
ings of a single X-ray of which only two were considered reliable
by the administrative law judge. The remaining readings con-
flicted with each other.9 4 Based on this evidence, the administra-
tive law judge concluded that there was true doubt as to whether
the claimant's X-ray established the presence of pneumoconiosis.15
Applying the true doubt rule, the judge resolved the doubt in the
favor of the claimant by invoking the interim presumption. 6 Since
the judge also concluded that the employer's rebuttal evidence was
insufficient, benefits were awarded. 7 In reviewing the decision of
the administrative law judge, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the prescript of Mullins was met, reasoning that the strong lan-
guage of the Secretary of Labor supportive of the true doubt rule
(the Secretary of Labor's comments that accompanied the regula-
tions 8 quoted by the United States Supreme Court in Mullins),
left it intact.99 The court also concluded that the true doubt rule,
as applied in the case at hand, was consistent with the Administra-
dicta is incorporated in the Supreme Court's holding since it states, "fin sum, we find the
Secretary's interpretation of his own regulations entirely consistent with its text." Id.
88. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 144 n.12. The Supreme Court seems to have supported the
continued application of the true doubt rule by stating:
Petitioners agree that the employer's rebuttal burden is one of proof as well as pro-
duction. The Secretary also takes the position that the presumption should be in-
voked in cases of 'true doubt' that is, if the claimant's and employer's invocation
evidence is of equal weight. . This position ensures that the employer will win, on
invocation or rebuttal, only when its evidence is stronger than the claimant's.
Id.
89. 988 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
90. Freeman, 988 F.2d at 709.





96. Freeman, 988 F.2d at 708.
97. Id. at 708-09.
98. See note 81.
99. Id. at 711-12.
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tive Procedure Act because section 554(d), as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Transportation Management, merely requires
that the claimant meet a burden of production.100 Finally, the
court concluded that the true doubt rule was consistent with Mul-
lins and the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore, the
claimant was entitled to benefits.' 10
On similar grounds, the Sixth Circuit, in Skukan v. Consolida-
tion Coal Co.,'0 2 upheld the application of the true doubt rule to a
claim filed under the permanent regulations. On the issue of pres-
ence of the disease, the administrative law judge in Skukan em-
ployed the true doubt rule."0 3 This prompted the employer to cross
appeal. 04 To resolve the case, the court applied arguments similar
to those of Freeman'05 to support the view that the true doubt rule
did not compromise the edict of Mullins (requiring evidence of the
disease to be demonstrated by the preponderance of the evi-
dence). 06 Concerning the argument that the Administrative Proce-
dure Act was violated by application of the true doubt rule, the
court explained that the true doubt rule was simply a judicial as-
signment of the burden of persuasion to the employer, which is
made only after the claimant has met his burden of proof as re-
quired by the Administrative Procedure Act. 07 The court con-
cluded that section 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act
merely assigned the burden of production to the claimant and set
the standard of persuasion as a preponderance of the evidence. 08
Finally, concerning the requirement that the party making an alle-
gation prove the associated facts, found at section 718.404 of the
permanent regulations, 09 the court reasoned that the application
of the true doubt rule does not reduce the preponderance of the
evidence standard because section 718.3(c) of the permanent regu-
lation requires that the claimant be given the benefit of all reason-
100. Id. at 711.
101. Id. at 712.
102. 993 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1993).
103. Skukan, 993 F.2d at 1234.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1235 (see note 89 and accompanying text). The court cited dicta in Mullins
(see note 88) supportive of the true doubt rule. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1235-36 (See note 58 and accompanying text). The court relied on the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act made in Transportation
Management. Id.
108. Skukan, 993 F.2d at 1236-38.
109. Id. at 1238. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.403 (1993).
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able doubts. 110 The court concluded that the application of the
true doubt rule does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act,
the holding of Mullins, or the permanent Black Lung
Regulations.'
In Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, decided a
month after Greenwich Collieries, the Third Circuit predictably
took the opposite view of the Seventh Circuit in Freeman and the
Sixth Circuit in Skukan on the issue of whether the Administra-
tive Procedure Act was violated by the application of the true
doubt rule. In Maher Terminals, the claimant, widow of the de-
ceased, filed a claim for temporary disability benefits due the dece-
dent for the period between injury and death and for death bene-
fits due her thereafter.11 s The administrative law judge found that
evidence was equally probative on the issue of whether the injury
was work related,11 4 and settled the dispute by resolving doubts in
favor of the claimant.115 The Third Circuit disagreed with the ad-
ministrative law judge's application of the true doubt rule, reason-
ing that Transportation Management and Steadman, read to-
gether with the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure
Act, required that the claimant must meet both the burden of pro-
duction and the burden of persuasion.1 The Third Circuit further
reasoned that such an interpretation was possible if the holding of
Transportation Management1 7 were limited to situations involv-
110. Skukan, 993 F.2d at 1238. The full text of the referenced regulation, § 718.3(c),
states:
In enacting Title IV of the Act, Congress intended that claimants be given the bene-
fits of all reasonable doubt as to the existence of total or partial disability or death
due to pneumoconiosis. This part shall be construed and applied in that spirit and is
designed to reflect that intent. However, no claim shall be approved unless the record
considered as a whole, in light of any applicable presumptions, provides a reasonable
basis for determining that the criteria for eligibility under the Act and this part have
been met.
20 C.F.R. § 718.3 (1993).
111. Skukan, 993 F.2d at 1239.
112. 992 F.2d 1277 (3d. Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3254 (Sept 23,
1993) (No. 93-474).
113. Maher, 992 F.2d at 1278.
114. Id. at 1280. Decedent was originally injured on July 3, 1985, when he jerked his
neck, "in order to avoid a shackle that was swinging towards him." Id. at 1279. Upon exam-
ination the next day, the decedent's physician diagnosed the injury as a muscle strain. Sev-
eral weeks later, the decedent experienced severe numbness in his left arm. This symptom
was found to be due to a tumor on the spinal cord. Shortly after an operation to remove the
tumor, the decedent died. Id.
115. Id. at 1280.
116. Id. at 1282-85.
117. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 403. The Supreme Court in Transpor-
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ing affirmative defenses.11 Consequently, it concluded that the ap-
plication of the true doubt rule was contrary to the Administrative
Procedure Act."19
The statement by the Secretary of Labor, quoted from the rec-
ord in Mullins,'120 not only unequivocally endorsed the true doubt
rule but it defined it as well, leaving no doubt that the Department
of Labor considered the rule valid. The Supreme Court's literal
holding in Mullins was not that the preponderance of evidence
standard was required, but rather, that the Secretary's interpreta-
tion (which of course leads to the same conclusion) was consistent
with the regulation's text.121 Thus the actual text of the Supreme
Court opinion (as opposed to the Third Circuit's characterization
of the holding in Mullins) more strongly lends support to the view
that the Supreme Court might also adopt the Secretary's endorse-
ment of the true doubt rule. Coupled with the permanent regula-
tion, 2' requiring that reasonable doubt should be resolved in the
favor of the claimant, such a possibility seems all the more proba-
ble. Yet, this endorsement of the rule appears to have been dicta,
since the validity of the true doubt rule was not at issue in Mul-
lins. If the statement of the Secretary is viewed as dicta, then,
from a formalistic standpoint, the Third Circuit's straight applica-
tion of Mullins was correct. However, as Justice Holmes long ago
posited, the law requires more from the judiciary than just "doing
their sums right."'123 Unfortunately, the absence of any comment
by the Third Circuit (even just to discount the Secretary's state-
ment) regarding this "dicta" appears to be a case of the court rest-
ing on its sums.
In analyzing whether the Black Lung Regulations require that
the claimant have the burden of persuasion, the Third Circuit is
obviously correct in asserting that it may not revise the Black
Lung Benefits Act. However, it seems a stretch of reasoning to con-
tation Management interpreted § 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which states
that, "the proponent of a rule or an order has the burden of proof[,]" to determine only the
burden of production. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988)).
118. Maher, 992 F.2d at 1284.
119. Id. at 1285.
120. See note 85.
121. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 152.
122. 20 C.F.R. § 718.3 (1992). See note 106.
123. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path Of The Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 458, 465
(1897). Justice Holmes was referring to the rather entrenched and rigid view that problems




sider the meaning of the expression "burden of proving a fact" to
be equivalent to that of the expression "burden of proof" such a
revision of the Act. 2 4 In fact, the only distinction, in common us-
age, between the words "proof" and "prove" is function. "Prove" is
simply the verb formulation of the noun "proof" and the definition
of proof includes the latter.125 The Third Circuit's analysis of this
expression strikes this author as a distinction without a difference.
If the expression "burden of proving a fact" is interpreted to be
equivalent to the expression "burden of proof," then the true
doubt rule generally, and as applied to Ondecko's case in particu-
lar (where evidence was produced on all three elements of his
claim), in no way contravenes the Black Lung Regulations 2 " be-
cause the term burden of proof may be read to connote merely the
burden of production.
Assuming the above analysis is correct, it is accurate to conclude
that the Black Lung Regulations do not specifically allocate the
burden of persuasion. The allocation of this standard of proof to
the proponent may, however, as the Third Circuit concluded in
Maher, be required by the Administrative Procedure Act.'27 The
reasoning of Maher clearly misstates the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Transportation Management (which in-
terpreted section 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act to
only allocate the burden of production to the proponent of an or-
der). The Third Circuit in Maher interpreted the first sentence to
allocate the burden of production and the third sentence to allo-
cate the burden of persuasion to the claimant in all cases except
where the employer is trying to prove an affirmative defense. 28
Such a narrow reading of the United States Supreme Court's
unanimous opinion is unfathomable in light of the Court's clear
statement to the contrary.'29
124. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
125. Webster's Dictionary defines "prove" as "to establish the truth by evidence"
whereas "proof" is defined as "a proving or being proved and convincing evidence." WEB-
STER'S DICTIONARY 1816-17, 26 (3d ed. 1987).
126. 20 C.F.R. § 718.403 (1992).
127. Note that in Greenwich this line of reasoning was not considered because the
Third Circuit believed that the Black Lung Benefits Act addressed the issue. See note 29
and accompanying text. The Third Circuit's opinion on Maher was filed one month after
Greenwich. Maher, 992 F.2d 1277.
128. Maher, 992 F.2d at 1281-83.
129. The Supreme Court stated that, "[slince the General Counsel is the proponent of
the order, asserts respondent, the General Counsel must bear the burden of proof. Section
7(d), however determines only the burden of going forward, not the burden of persuasion."
Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 403 n.7 (citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
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In arriving at its decision to eliminate the true doubt rule, the
Third Circuit appears to have misread precedent, ignored dicta
strongly supportive of the true doubt rule, and made a questiona-
ble interpretation of relevant regulations. Totally lost in the mo-
rass is the historical reality that workers' compensation laws be-
came necessary because of the practical impossibility of ordinary
workers to obtain legal remedies for injuries on the job.13 0 It is
somewhat ironic that the Third Circuit would strain, as it seems to
have done in both Maher and Greenwich, to make it more difficult
for a claimant to prevail on a workers' compensation claim, espe-
cially in light of the terrible human suffering that the victims of
black lung disease incur. Because of the deep division between the
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits on the validity of the true
doubt rule, the prospect of resolution by the United States Su-
preme Court appears ideal.13 1 Considering the questionable under-
pinnings used in Greenwich and Maher to eliminate the true doubt
rule, it would be surprising if the United States Supreme Court
endorsed the reasoning of these decisions.
Stephen Yula
v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1004, 1013-15 (D.C. Cir.1976), cert. denied sub nom. Velsicol Chem.
Corp. v. EPA, 481 U.S. 925 (1977)).
130. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300-2 (1985). A commonly
held view is that tort law in general and negligence law in particular became especially oner-
ous for plaintiffs because the encouragement of economic growth during this period (at the
time of the industrial revolution) was paramount and society as a whole could ill afford the
economic drain of personal liability suits. C.f. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300-
02
131. Note that the claimant in Maher filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court on September 23, 1993.
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